In short
The server of an end-to-end encrypted password manager stores records only in encrypted form. Passwords, logins, site addresses, notes and 2FA secrets are encrypted in your browser with a key that your password or recovery file unlocks; a recipient you share with gets the key to the chosen record or vault only. The service sees service data — identifiers, sizes, change times, granted access and alias addresses — but not what records contain.
People trust a password manager with what matters most, so the key question isn't “how secure is the server” but “what happens if the server turns out not to be”. The answer depends on where encryption happens.
What's visible and what isn't
| Data | Server sees | Where it's opened |
|---|---|---|
| Passwords and logins | No, ciphertext only | In your browser |
| Site addresses and names | No | In your browser |
| 2FA secrets | No | The code is computed in the browser |
| Notes and vault names | No | In your browser |
| Your public key | Yes | Needed so others can share a record with you |
| Internal identifiers, sizes, change times | Yes | Needed to sync devices |
| Who you shared with | Yes, without the record's contents | Needed to deliver the key to the recipient |
| Email alias addresses | Yes | Needed to receive mail |
| Alias mail at the moment of receipt | Yes, before encryption | Arrives over ordinary SMTP, then stored encrypted |
How it works
At sign-up the app creates a key pair in your browser using the open OpenPGP standard. The private key is protected by your password through Argon2, a function that makes password guessing expensive. Only the protected key envelope goes to the server.
Each record is encrypted with its own key, which is in turn encrypted with the vault key. That's why you can share one record without opening the rest: the recipient gets that record's key, encrypted to their public key.
If the database is stolen
An attacker gets ciphertext and protected key envelopes. To read the records they'd have to guess your password for each envelope separately, and Argon2 makes every guess slow and memory-hungry. A long, unique PasswordX password turns that guessing into a pointless waste of resources.
Your vault is as strong as your password and your recovery file, not as strong as our server's defences.
Rollback protection
Hiding the contents isn't enough: a server could return an old version of the vault, say one with a password you've since changed. The app remembers the last signed state it saw and compares it with the server's response. If the version has gone back or belongs to someone else, you'll see a warning.
What encryption doesn't solve
- Malware on your device can read what you open.
- The site you type your password into receives it in the clear, so check the page address before typing.
- Alias mail arrives as ordinary email: the service sees it on receipt, and only then is it encrypted.
- If you lose both your password and your recovery file, we can't restore access: we have no back door.